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Abstract  
 
The intellectual property regimes we have currently in place are heavily under attack. One of the points 
of criticism is the interaction between two elements of article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the widely discussed issue of being able to benefit from scientific progress and the less 
argued for position of having a right to take part in scientific enterprises. To shine light on the question 
if we should balance the two elements or prioritize one of them, an exploration will be offered on how 
benefiting from scientific progress and the ability to participate in the advancement of science relate to 
securing human capabilities. A different perspective to the question will be gained by identifying the 
problem as an issue of misrecognition, especially the failure to recognize many willing collaboration 
partners in scientific research as peers. Lastly, I will argue that cooperative justice requires that if we 
have an innovation incentive system that disproportionally benefits one particular group, a certain duty 
to counterbalance this advantage exists when we are relying on mutual cooperation for the recognition 
of intellectual property rights.  
 
Keywords: scientific participation; objects of innovation; development; global justice; human rights; 
human capabilities; recognition as peers. 
 
  
 
 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, hereinafter UDHR) states “[e]veryone 
has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.” In the following I will concentrate in the last section of this 
article, the right to share in and benefit from scientific advancement. This part of article 27 contains 
two elements, the idea of sharing in a particular endeavour and the possibility of enjoying the benefits 
of such type of enterprises. In this article I will conceptualize the relation of the two elements to (1) 
human capabilities and (2) ensuring recognition, then (3) discuss the effects on global justice caused 
by pursuing any of the two elements independently, and lastly (4) analyse the problem of cooperative 
justice with a special emphasis on the way we have chosen to incentivize innovation: intellectual 
property.  
The purpose of this examination is to highlight the effects on the fulfilment of human rights in general 
a potential prioritization of any of the two elements of this right may have. Hereby I will take the 
intellectual property regimes we have now established as the background condition in order to better 
judge the existing incentive system and to serve as a tool to analyse any proposed alternative system. A 
brief overview to those regimes and their effect on the rights enshrined in article 27 will serve as an 
introduction.  
 
Introduction 
 
Many, but certainly not all inventions we have nowadays on our shelves and surroundings came to 
existence due to the possibility of recouping expensive research and development costs. Patents, most 
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prominently, but also plant breeders’ rights, trademarks and, in some jurisdictions database rights, 
enable researchers to make their investigations lucrative. These exclusive rights have become globally 
increasingly important after the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) progressively started to become effective worldwide from 1994 onward. The TRIPS 
agreement made it binding for all World Trade Organization member states to recognize intellectual 
property rights and allows trade sanctions for countries where violations of those rights are 
commonplace. Nowadays patent rights have a validity of mostly 20 years, while copyright lasts 
commonly 70 years after the author’s death.  
Granting a temporary exclusive right to innovators on their invention may allow them to recoup their 
prior expenses (including advertising costs) by preventing competitors to free-ride on their creative 
effort. For this however to be successful, a number of conditions apply: (i) the fruits of their labour 
have to attract a given number of customers with sufficient purchasing power, (ii) the developed 
objects should not contradict public morals1, and (iii) meet certain minimum inventiveness and novelty 
criteria to be granted exclusive rights. Further, (iv) the possibility to attract a sufficient number of 
paying customers is higher for objects that cannot be independently reproduced. Objects of innovation 
that do not meet these criteria will have a hard time recouping their research and development costs.  
Relying primarily on this instrument for incentivizing research has two negative consequences: one, 
fundamental research and indigenous innovation are insufficiently incentivized, and two, refraining 
from using exclusive rights to recoup research and development costs has become a luxury many 
cannot afford.  
The first problem leads to future undersupply, something that has to be addressed using different 
incentive mechanisms. This is the case with fundamental research, which predominantly in the 
developed world is financed by governmental grants. Fomenting the creation of new tools for their 
industry constitutes a main motive for continuing to do so (Stephan 2012). The case of traditional 
knowledge (here encompassing indigenous, tribal and grassroots innovation) is less fortunate, a lobby 
demanding funds seems unable to recruit sufficient political influence for this branch of innovation, 
leaving the support for a stimulating infrastructure and network in a precarious state. To add to this 
problem, it has been argued that many people are so poor that they can only make use of technological 
advancement if the inventions can be reproduced using spare local resources (Gupta 2010). 
Inaccessibility to the benefits of scientific progress becomes inevitable when this is not deliberately 
taken into account. If research agendas are dictated according to market demands, being defined by the 
monetary size of the market, not the number of customers, the huge purchasing power disparities will 
greatly misrepresent per capita demand and thus people’s basic necessities. There will be no 
democratic setting of research agendas, which will leave the needs of the poor systematically 
unfulfilled when they fail to match the ones of the economically prosperous (cf. Korthals and 
Timmermann 2012). Necessity may also oblige the global poor to use technologies that are deemed 
culturally unacceptable (Chapman 2009) or socially inadequate. This is a problem from which citizens 
of countries with strong democratic commitments do not escape either. People had no alternative than 
to accept certain technologies, an example being the wide use of genetically modified crops for animal 
feed, despite the wide public rejection of genetically modified organisms.2 In a globalization context, 
Elizabeth Anderson (2007) notes that the effectiveness of contraceptive policies is in jeopardy in 
societies where women do not see themselves as agents who actively choose to have sex, which make 
contraception methods that require planning and daily use socially inadequate. This omission has far-
reaching effects on population control and career development for women, particularly in non-Western 
societies. 
                                                         
1 Cf. TRIPS agreement (1994), article 27(2): “Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre 
public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation 
is prohibited by their law.”  2 For Europe, see TNS Opinion & Social (2010). While the rejection of genetically modified organisms 
is less fierce in other parts of the world, the recent ballot on California’s Proposition 37 show that a 
great percentage of the state’s population wants to know which foods contain genetically modified 
organisms.  
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While the first problem has been greatly discussed as a matter of global justice (cf. Pogge 2008), the 
second problem, concerning the direction research is taking, has gathered less attention. Perhaps most 
prominently the latter has been addressed by the free/libre and open source software movement 
(Schoonmaker 2007).  
As mentioned earlier, the societal recognition of intellectual property enables inventors and their 
financial backers or supporters to recoup their research expenses by applying for temporary exclusive 
rights. Those rights are, as the name clearly states, exclusive – by definition some people will not have 
access to the protected object for the limited period that the patentee is granted a monopoly use of his 
or her invention. While the open source software movement is primarily concerned with the 
malleability of the objects of innovation, particularly their adaptability to personal needs, the impact of 
exclusive rights on science and technological development is of much greater scope. Hesitation to 
reveal early findings has increased in order to ensure patentability of subject matter, thus limiting 
scientific discussion and the spontaneous sharing of samples (Eisenberg 2008). Using exclusive rights 
for sales creates artificial scarcity, leaving some people without the benefits of scientific progress. 
Those classical economic dead-weights are literary dead-weights when it comes to vital medicines 
(Pogge 2008) or specific crops destined for harsh environments. If research can only be undertaken by 
being subject to the use of market incentives that rely on intellectual property rights, it will inevitably 
restrict some people from enjoying the benefits of scientific advancement. As the excluded group 
consists primarily of the global poor, people with certain moral convictions might find it objectionable 
in itself to add to greater inequality by leaving the worst off people in a relative inferior position.3 
Promoting scientific advancement would under such conditions contradict some types of egalitarian 
notions of justice.  
Relying on market mechanisms in a world of extreme inequalities does not only shape research 
agendas towards a very particular, not democratically chosen, direction, but attracts the overwhelming 
amount of resources to one small section of science: the development of saleable technological 
products.  
The more scientists and engineers manage to recoup their research and development costs by making 
use of exclusive rights and thus become self-sustained, the higher the pressure for others to follow the 
same procedure. Scientists and engineers who are not self-sustained become the exception rather than 
the rule. Choosing to practice science that does not aim at making profits, or generally seeking for 
openness, becomes a luxury that is increasingly harder to defend. To escape this burden scientists and 
researchers continuously switch to research lines and methods that appear commercially valuable – 
doing so reinforces societal expectancies of science being self-sustainable. This endangers cognitive 
diversity and we have to remember that science has benefited greatly from the few rational agents who 
due to stubbornness or self-confidence have insisted on less prominent rival theories who have proven 
to turn out accurate (cf. Kitcher 1990). A good example is Alfred Wegener, who after publishing his 
groundwork on plate tectonics 1912 spent the remaining time of his life fighting for support, 
disregarding the hostility with which his theory was received. He only received wide recognition for 
his great contribution in the early 70s, over three decades after his death (Greene 1984). 
 
On the legal history of the article 27 
 
The dominant reading among legal scholars of article 27 of the UDHR sees it as the basis of the human 
right to benefit from scientific progress.4 The emphasis on this specific dimension has pushed the right 
to participate in scientific endeavours into obscurity. One reason for such reading might have been the 
phrasing of what is considered the corresponding article to the UDHR article 27, the International                                                         
3 An interesting example is the technological progress in fuel efficiency for vehicles. If the rise of fuel 
prices is (at least slightly) counterbalanced by the availability of more fuel-efficient cars, public 
outrage due to the unavailability of options is dampened. However this option is only available for 
countries whom themselves are producing technologies. Poorer countries have to continue to rely on 
the older fuel-inefficient alternatives while paying proportionally much more for fuel. 
4 Examples of this interpretation are offered by cf. Chapman (2009); Marks (2011); Donders (2011); 
and Plomer (2012). The reading I defend hereafter is in part shared by Shaver (2010). 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966, hereinafter ICESCR) article 15.1.5 This 
article does not mention scientific participation unambiguously by name: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
 
To see scientific life as part of being able to participate in enlarging the cultural heritage of humankind 
might require more interpretative work than legal scholarship commonly allows. First, one has to 
consider science as part of the cultural heritage of humankind. Conceding that, one has to understand a 
right to “take part” as having not only a passive connotation (being a spectator or a recipient) but also 
an active element (being an actor or contributor). This however seems to have been the thought of the 
Chinese delegate during the drafting sessions of the Universal Declaration. Peng-chun Chang noted 
that “not only must the right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement be guaranteed to 
everyone but also the right to participate in work of scientific creation. In the arts, letters and sciences 
alike, aesthetic enjoyment had a dual aspect: a purely passive aspect when man appreciates beauty and 
an active aspect when he creates it” (quoted in United Nations 1948, transcribed).  
A contribution to science is required to take into critical consideration previous scientific knowledge 
and to do so in a more systematic manner than is generally prevalent in other areas of cultural life. In 
science originality is not a virtue in itself, a laudable contribution has to consist in either a major 
revision of existing theory or exploring the previously unknown. Therefore familiarity with the state-
of-the-art is virtually a prerequisite. Due to those differences capacity building becomes mandatory to 
enable people to participate in scientific life. 
Understanding human rights primarily as a set of negative duties will favour a reading that at the most 
prohibits unjustifiable exclusion of people from cultural life. The history of the drafting of ICESCR 
article 15.1 suggests however that more was on the mind of human rights legislators than this 
minimum constraint. An initial draft6 submitted by the UNESCO contained the following elements: 
 
The Signatory States undertake to encourage the preservation, development and propagation 
of science and culture by every appropriate means: 
(a) By facilitating for all access to manifestations of national and international cultural 
life, such as books, publications and works of art, and also the enjoyment of the 
benefits resulting from scientific progress and its applications; 
(b) By preserving and protecting the inheritance of books, works of art and other 
monuments and objects of historic, scientific and cultural interest; 
(c) By assuring liberty and security to scholars and artists in their work and seeing that 
they enjoy material conditions necessary for research and creation;  
(d) By guaranteeing the free cultural development of racial and linguistic minorities.  
 
The UNESCO draft is far more explicit in identifying positive duties and a dichotomy between 
scientific and cultural life becomes harder to defend. This passage does also not lead us to think that 
being identified as a scholars or artist is a prospect limited to an exclusive group of people. Together 
with clauses that forbid discrimination, section (c) of the cited draft article gives us to understand that 
ensuring the basic circumstances for being able to participate in scholarly activities was an ambition 
early human rights legislators indeed had in mind. The Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the 
Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications issued 2009 by the UNESCO reaffirms this 
position, by raising awareness on the huge disparities in research capacities between the developed and                                                         
5 In relation to food production, ICESCR article 11.2(a) foresees that “States Parties … individually 
and through international co-operation … [shall take measures to] improve methods of production, 
conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by 
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian 
systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural 
resources”. 
6 Quoted in Green (2000) 
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the developing world. Among the negative effects of a lacking research infrastructure count the 
inability to influence the direction of scientific progress and the capacity to hold governments 
accountable for it, the lack of participation opportunities for citizens and difficulties in assessing the 
impact of science and technological development (UNESCO 2009).  
The sections that follow will provide philosophical arguments on why this suggested reading should be 
adopted. While I will continuously address the influence of intellectual property, this should not be 
understood as it being the only factor or the most significant issue at stake. Loss of resources due to 
corruption in educational and research institutes, the widespread refusal to educate women, missing or 
inaccessible day-care facilities for children particularly limiting the career opportunities of young 
mothers, plus the huge inequalities in income, are factors that might have a far greater influence for 
scientific participation. Additionally, securing the freedom to move and communicate beyond national 
borders thus facilitating social encounters that can materialize in future collaborations is a key element 
to foster scientific advancement.   
 
A human capabilities perspective 
 
The link between scientific advancement and human capabilities is twofold. Participating in scientific 
endeavours can help people reach certain capabilities and the fruits of such undertakings can provide 
technologies as well as knowledge that can play a substantial role in expanding human functioning.7 
The first aspect falls under the human rights element of sharing in scientific advancement, the second 
under benefiting from scientific enterprises8.  
Some objects of innovation help people to attain capabilities that their personal condition would not 
have allowed, e.g. a wheelchair greatly enhances the possibilities of free movement for a person with 
certain types of disabilities. Other objects allow people to restore their functioning to the original state, 
e.g. recover from a disease or rehabilitate one’s damaged natural environment.9 A third category of 
objects substantially facilitates daily life interactions and meliorates living conditions. We may think 
of the invention of sanitation systems, facilitating the provision of clean water and the adequate 
disposal of sewage, leaving people with substantially more spare time for leisure activities. Cheap and 
readily available paediatric vaccines have reduced the time having to be spent caring for sick children. 
Women, who are disproportionally overburdened with such tasks, have gained substantially with such 
improvements by having more time to pursue other goals in their lives. Communication technologies 
allow people to participate in political discussions with up-to-date knowledge. In sum, scientific 
knowledge coupled with engineering skills and understanding allow people to achieve, restore and 
facilitate the enjoyment of objects covered by human rights clauses and identified as central human 
capabilities. Nonetheless, we should be critical to what we empower people to do, science can be put 
both at service but also to the detriment of society.  
 
The sustainable development of new technologies through scientific advancement inevitably raises the 
bar of what may be considered normal human functioning.10 To take an example, scientific progress in 
the area of nutrition has shown us that many of the disorders once thought inevitable are traceable to 
specific micronutrients deficiencies, shifting many of those widespread disorders to the category of                                                         
7 The capability approach distinguishes between functionings and capabilities. Functionings relates to 
what one can do and be, e.g. being creative and contribute to knowledge. Capabilities refer to the 
opportunities to achieve the mentioned beings and doings, e.g. choosing to develop one’s creativity or 
having the freedom to undertake the necessary tasks to be able to contribute knowledge (Robeyns 
2011). 
8 The link between capabilities and the right to benefit from the scientific advancement has been 
discussed by Marks (2011) at great length. 
9 In order to ensure that objects of innovation are indeed converted into capabilities or functioning, not 
only personal conversion factors (i.e. individual limitations or special talents) have to be taken into 
consideration, but also social and environmental conversion factors, cf. Robeyns (2005). Here design 
can play a bridging function to facilitating an effective conversion, cf. Oosterlaken (2009). 
10 Non-sustainable development will have the opposite effect. With environmental degradation, or 
deterioration of health in general, lesser functioning can be expected. A more sedentary life style has 
already lowered the threshold line of what was considered normal bodily functioning in the past. 
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that which is preventable. Knowledge on what constitutes a better diet and the safer handling of food, 
such as refrigeration, hygiene and pasteurization, has triggered the search for technological solutions to 
overcome existing shortcomings. The development and widespread use of those technological 
solutions raised the level of what is considered normal human functioning by a greater satisfaction of 
physiological needs. However this improvement demands further research, as new scientific 
knowledge and technical knowhow is again needed to overcome the negative effects of this change, as 
well as to maintain and regulate the technological products implemented (cf. Baulcombe et al. 2009). 
Generally we can say that the advancement of science and the availability of new technologies allows 
us, or even obliges us, to periodically reconsider which capabilities society can reasonably facilitate for 
people.   
  
The capabilities approach can justify both a claim to have access to the objects of innovation and 
inclusion in their development. Access to those objects may expand human functioning and thus is of 
instrumental importance. With regard to inclusion in scientific research and technological 
development, the capabilities approach requires a longer line of argument. Here participation can be 
justified instrumentally as it fosters the full use of one’s senses, imagination and thoughts, to use 
Nussbaum’s terminology (cf. Nussbaum 1997). Arguing for a right to scientific participation 
opportunities would have a weak foundation if it is solely based on being a vehicle for using or 
promoting one’s mental faculties. As a philosopher, I can escape the charge of narcissism by arguing 
that participation in scientific endeavours facilitates the use of one’s mental faculties in a meaningful 
manner.11 Not being limited to engage in meaningless endeavours alone can be considered as a 
prerequisite to claim that one enjoys full human functioning. Nowadays it is inevitable that wanting it 
or not, some daily activities will be devoid of meaning or purpose, as some tedious tasks still have to 
be completed to meet our basic needs. We can nevertheless argue that being able to enjoy a good life 
requires that at least some aspects of life have meaning. A prosperous society that seeks to ensure 
human capabilities will have to grant some liberty in where a person wants to find meaning in her daily 
undertakings. While some can content themselves in finding meaning in personal relationships, other 
people need a certain social infrastructure to find meaning in their life. One of those social constructs 
where a series of people are bound to find meaning in their lives are scientific enterprises.12 That being 
true, we could stipulate that a certain duty to enable those people to take part in such initiatives will 
fall to scientific enterprises in general by virtue of being the sole locus where those people could 
realize their concept of a good life. That the right to work is commonly understood as one being able to 
find an adequate job supports this perspective (cf. Steinvorth 2009). Recognizing a societal duty to 
facilitate meaningful interactions would direct all types of socially meaningful endeavours with a call 
for inclusion. Here we can think of duties of non-discrimination among groups of people with 
comparable scientific abilities13, as well as positive duties in terms of engaging underrepresented 
groups in scientific activities.  
Conceding a right to participate in science will raise certain demands for not only being able to 
undertake trivial research, but also to take also part in advanced scientific enterprises. Scientific work 
is one of the tasks that is affected by the Aristotelian Principle as identified by Rawls, meaning that 
while practicing science one continuously develops certain skills and this may lead to high virtuosity in 
a given field.14 As Rawls (1999) states, “… human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized 
capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is 
realized, or the greater the complexity”– in science encouraging the realization of those capacities will                                                         
11 To define “meaningful” in this context, we can borrow from a definition of “meaningful work” 
provided by Arneson (1987). He identifies the following characteristics: work has to be interesting, 
calling for intelligence and initiative, allow the worker a considerable freedom to determine how the 
work is to be done and having a democratic say on the work process as well as employer’s policies. I 
would further add that one’s work should be subjectively identifiable as a contribution to the well 
functioning of society (provided this is a freedom one wants to pursue). 
12 Alternatively, we can frame a demand of being included by recognizing that some people identify a 
scientific career as a calling or vocation (sich zur Wissenschaft berufen fühlen), cf. Weber (1919/2002).  
13 E.g. if our goal is food security and that is our main valuation criteria, a promising seed variety 
should not be judged based on its origin but on proven efficacy. Brand labels should not play a role in 
the assessment.  
14 Cf. Rawls (1999), here I rely strongly on the interpretation of Taylor (2004) and Dumitru (2008) 
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have to be linked to capacity-building efforts as well as guaranteeing basic material needs, otherwise 
people with few means would be systematically left out.15 In addition, it has been repeatedly argued 
that prolonged repetitive and dull work limits the possibilities to successfully engage in creative work 
in the future, and this not only professionally but also during one’s spare time (see Sayer 2011, with 
accompanying references).  
 
More interesting is it to see inclusion in innovative enterprises as having the additional capability to 
actively care for one’s society, nature or a particular individual, while seeking for a solution by making 
use of one’s reason.  
There are two elements in showing concern, one being the possibility to express an emotion, e.g. 
sorrow, or being able to protest. While this is something Western societies now take for granted, we 
should not forget that this has been a societal achievement. However the possibility to express 
dissatisfaction with the current level of welfare or a case of misfortune should not be limited to the 
emotional level for the majority of the world population. Nowadays, most people in the world can only 
change their current situation or the situation of the people they are concerned about by physical labour 
or by making use of their bodies. People that are unskilful with their bodies or whose body manifest 
endowments of scarce social appreciation, have hardly an option to do something to promote their 
cause. Here I do not want to put emphasis on actually succeeding, but merely on being able to 
undertake a considerable effort in that direction or, more colloquially, the possibility of “giving it a 
good try”.  
The great majority of the world’s population could do significantly more in helping the people they 
care about if they work in an environment that promotes the use of their intellectual faculties and 
facilitates peer evaluation of resulting ideas. The actual value of traditional knowledge, or parallel 
knowledge systems in general, for industrial and academic science is heavily debated (cf. ICSU Study 
Group on Science and Traditional Knowledge 2002). However, treating as non-existent contributions 
that are not using standardized nomenclature and written in customary “scientific style” obstructs the 
efforts of millions to increase social welfare. It also suggests that industrial and academic science has a 
far greater role in solving today’s problems than one should legitimately attribute it. 
 
Justifying inclusion from a capability “to actively care for others” perspective has also an additional 
advantage. Being motivated by wanting to help others, driven by a sense of fraternity, and choosing 
science as a vehicle to manifest concerns makes science a social enterprise. Practicing science for such 
a purpose has to be interwoven with the social context, demanding up-to-date knowledge of prior art as 
well as extensive research networks. Herewith the demand is to not understand science as a solitary 
occupation but emphasize its interactional character. While a sophisticated computer simulator could 
in theory secure the capability to use one’s senses and imagination, the possibility to have an impact on 
society is a prerequisite for ensuring the capability to actively care for others by using one’s intellect.16  
 
However the use of this capability has some shortcomings. First, if scientific participation possibilities 
are grounded on fulfilling the capability “to actively care for others”, those scientific enterprises will 
have to be bound to delivering products that directly benefit society. Scientists will thus not be able to 
pursue their curiosity as they like – a traditional scientific liberty will have to be given up. Second, if 
we ground inclusion in scientific enterprises on a capability “to actively care for others” we do not                                                         
15 If we acknowledge John Harris’ arguments to consider scientific participation as a duty (Harris 
2005; Chan and Harris 2009), providing the necessary infrastructure will allow a broader range of 
people to discharge such duty, and this not only as research subjects but also as researching entities. 
16 We might consider facilitating wide scale migration of talented scientists to the developed world as a 
possible solution to the problem. However, we should test this solution with the liberty of being able to 
live in one’s social and cultural environment. Having to choose between the set of goods “family life, 
cultural and natural environment” and the possibility of practising science on a higher level will 
question the real freedom involved in that choice. Living in a world of limited resources demands a 
certain type of flexibility on the scientist’s behalf, which has to be commensurate to the sophistication 
of the demanded infrastructure. We can thus ask people to move from a rural to an urban area for some 
highly specialized careers, in some cases even from one country to the other. Capacity-building on 
tight budgets should aim at serving the greatest number of people, the selection of urban or rural 
locations for setting up research infrastructure should underlie this principle.  
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specify up to what level people have a right to be scientifically educated nor to which type of 
infrastructure they should have access to. At a minimum level, any contributor of a piece of knowledge 
that is absorbed by the scientific community is sharing in the advancement of science, thus enlarging 
the pool of knowledge from which socially relevant innovation can be developed. An indigenous 
community who has been victim of biopiracy is sharing in scientific advancement, even if deprived 
from moral interests such as attribution of authorship and eventual financial benefits.  
Since the obligations bound to securing the right to participate in scientific advancement will differ so 
drastically if society has to secure equality of opportunity in scientific careers while offering the 
necessary infrastructure, or merely a fair scientific assessment of contributions of knowledge, we will 
try to gain additional insights using recognition theories.     
 
Recognizing the developing world as a partner 
 
Let us assume that we could have a much higher rate of innovation if the developed world would be 
the sole provider of technological solutions. Any effort for capacity-building in developing countries 
would be relinquished in order to increase efficiency in scientific production in the developed world, 
and this under the benevolent argument, that the given distribution of research and development 
facilities leads to more people being able to enjoy the fruits of scientific progress worldwide. 
Conceding that there would be substantial welfare gains, some injustices would still be left unresolved.  
The resulting type of contentious relationship fits normatively under the rubric of the social problems 
of misrecognition, particularly the sort identified by Nancy Fraser under failing to recognize someone 
or a community as a peer (cf. Fraser 1998).  
The controversial issues surrounding the problem of recognition and its response are legion. First, 
global hazards are currently only tackled by a highly select section of the global community. This leads 
to the second problem, when people cannot mutually influence each other a biased perception of 
dependency is developed. Third, this feeling of dependency is not fully justified; humans by nature 
tend to skilfully adapt tools to their needs while using them. Innovation occurs everywhere – 
recognition thereof not. And lastly, some changes in distribution have to take place in order to ensure 
future recognition as peers.  
 
I will start with the first two points. The world we share with poor and rich alike as well as our bodies 
that share a common constitution are vulnerable to a variety of similar threats. Climate change and 
AIDS/HIV are perhaps two of the most prominent global hazards we currently face. While those 
hazards are global, the development of technological solutions occurs only in limited and exclusive 
communities. As those objects of innovation often facilitate the fulfilment of basic needs, the resulting 
relationship can be labelled as one of dependency. A picture of the developed world rescuing over and 
over again the global poor from naturally occurring and self-inflicted problems becomes inevitable. 
This can hardly be identified as a relationship among equals. If people are not able to mutually assist 
each other they will inevitably fail to see each other as peers. Especially in the area of science and 
engineering we have a huge potential to assist each other notwithstanding cultural differences. The 
objective treatment of knowledge permits a dialogue that in other areas of culture would be much more 
difficult to attain.  
The provision of a technical solution by one part of the world, i.e. the deliberate creation of a public 
good, may engender in the other part of the world a wish to reciprocate that will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to realize. Being without means might alleviate this felt burden, but nevertheless 
perpetuate a unilateral sense of debt.  
 
In a certain way, it is inevitable that some dependency endures. The mere existence of exclusive rights 
for inventions allows temporary monopolies. If the invention is a necessity – an object that helps 
people to secure their basic needs – dependency is the outcome. Nevertheless, we should still question 
a global social structure that systematically favours a specific type of innovation (i.e. the ones that are 
patentable) and innovating (proprietary research models) at the cost of grassroots innovation, advances 
in traditional farming and generally non-proprietary research practices. Therefore, the traditional 
methods of incremental improvements may be a more beneficial approach, especially if they are the 
only ones feasible for the major part of the world’s population.  
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There is a substantial difference between sustaining a group in need and perpetuating dependency. 
Situations of dependency that are preventable should not be judged on the same basis as inevitable 
dependency. Any policies that deliberately retard or hinder the efforts of some groups in gaining self-
sustainability should be judged as an attempt to limit self-determination.  
Awareness of one’s own or the other parties’ dependency has also some major effects in the economy, 
especially when bargaining agreements or settling sales contracts. The history of political economy has 
shown us that by fostering technological development states can gain a much stronger advantage in 
increasing the exchange ratio of their people’s labour hours than by continuing to produce or extract 
traditional goods (cf. Drahos and Braithwaite 2003; Galeano 1971/2008). This will leave people who 
abstain from technological innovation in a permanent position of disadvantage.  
We can nevertheless think of institutional arrangements that could lift this disadvantage, leaving 
questions of feasibility completely aside. A world where such disadvantages are neutralized would still 
be a place where one society can offer products that the other society will not be able to produce, as it 
will lack the infrastructure and necessary know-how. It will be a place where one group is obliged to 
engage in exchanges while the other can trade just if it sees an advantage in doing so. Intellectual 
property, creating artificial scarcity, not only grants exclusive rights, but also counts as a publicly 
documented proof of being the sole legal provider of a given asset. This is an advantage natural 
resources generally do not have – something that comes at quite a high price when bargaining for a 
fairer deal and for felt indispensability. In terms of productive capacity, some states could vanish 
altogether without causing disruption in the others’ daily life.  
 
Continuing with the third point. There is a huge amount of unacknowledged reciprocity for inventions 
placed in technology-dependent societies. Developers of technologies gain many insights from their 
users. It lies in human nature to develop and adapt tools. When people start using inventions made by 
others, it will not take much time until they find new uses. In order for it to be true that a community is 
solely a technology receiver, and not a co-inventor or technology adapter, inventiveness would not 
only have to be neglected, but even prohibited and severely sanctioned. As this is hardly enforceable, 
leaving aside its desirability as a target, the distinction between technology receivers and technology 
producers will always be artificial in absolute terms. Maintaining such labels inevitably leads to a 
situation where some inventiveness is not recognized as such. 
Furthermore, inventions are not placed in an abstract environment. Knowledge and innovative 
potential will be available in the habitat in which a technology is released. Rarely inventions are 
released in an environment where no predecessors are available. Generally in agriculture, new methods 
and seed varieties replace local practices and this is not always superseding the performance of earlier 
established systems. This tendency to ignore indigenous knowledge, or regard it in advance as inferior, 
is felt as an insult for many indigenous innovators. Often local knowledge is denied as a result of 
power differentials, the stronger party having the ability to decide whose knowledge counts as 
significant – an issue overly present in development projects (Dübgen 2012). This problem is 
accentuated with the tendency to treat indigenous knowledge as one type of knowledge system, while 
industrial and academic knowledge represent another system. It is common to see the two as strictly 
separated systems; that those systems may overlap or be of porous transition is something few take 
notice off. The idea that knowledge production systems outside academia and industry have to be first 
checked using scientific method is widespread in the developed world (cf. Agrawal 1995).  
Identifying one part of the world as the one that advances science and develops technology and the 
other part of the world as mere recipient, nurtures an atmosphere where any person coming from 
outside the established circles is perceived as being less worthy of attention. When academic or 
industry emblems make a much stronger case for judging the time one should invest in critically 
analysing a new proposal, than past performances or knowledge of the local environment, we can 
speak of discrimination.   
 
And finally, setting aside enough resources for capacity-building in order to distribute more evenly 
research and development facilities around the world could help remedy the here denounced situation 
of injustice. This would lead to a situation where every society can offer the other something that they 
momentarily will not be able to produce themselves. Even if what a society is producing amounts to 
little, this might be enough to lose the stigma of being labelled (or identifying oneself) as strictly 
dependent to the less uncomfortable position of being in the need of assistance (cf. Fraser and Gordon 
1994).  
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Capacity-building will also have to tackle another very broad problem: the issue of testimonial justice 
as identified by Miranda Fricker (2007). Scientists and technology developers in academia and 
industry adjust their work not only towards financial incentives, but also to reach peer recognition and 
gain group identity. The pursuit of this latter goal has the effect that a special jargon and working 
methods are developed. People not communicating in this jargon or using different methods become 
for established scientists harder to understand and to dialogue with than their habitual peers. 
Familiarity with certain subject matters creates a feeling of expertise, which completely new 
approaches do not provide. Radical changes demand much more concentration from the recipient. In 
order to guarantee fair evaluation, we not only have to stop depending exclusively on established 
practices, but also consciously dedicate more time to evaluate unfamiliar forms of expression.  
   
There is another element why participation in science is an important issue. By being able to 
participate in science one asserts a certain influence in its form and direction. Science and the products 
that become available with its progress, shape profoundly our daily lives; consistency with democratic 
values demands that those principles are dispersed into this sphere too. The direction research agendas 
take will have a strong effect on the shape of the future world. There is a democratic interest in having 
a say regarding what role technology should play in the future and not completely surrendered to 
decisions made by others.  
Proprietary science has made it almost impossible for economically poor aspiring participants to access 
the tools and fruits of scientific research and practice. At the same time it has become the predominant 
mode of practicing science and with the help of digital technologies this type of science has also 
become enormously networked. Despite the mentioned deficiencies, the protection of intellectual 
property rights has created incentives for investing in research and development, as well as created the 
necessary guarantees for industry to be able to disclose information related to an invention. The patent 
system’s novelty and non-obviousness requirements however are constantly pushing scientific research 
towards its limits. Science under this incentive mechanism moves towards meeting in the most cost-
effective manner a specific range of research targets that are compatible with the aim of reaching 
patentability requirements and ultimately market value. This has the consequence that many research 
interests that are scientific, but fall outside the reach of the incentives of proprietary science, are left 
unattended or do not receive proper care. The lack of attention given to those research fields is 
vulnerable to being perceived and interpreted as not being of equivalent merit. Here the market has 
become the entity that selects research agendas (cf. O'Neill 1990) – in a world of extreme economic 
inequalities, a strongly undemocratic mechanism. As so few people can influence research agendas 
through scientific participation, we have to consider alternative models or at least offer a strong 
enough parallel system that is able to rebalance the overall innovation system to add democratic 
legitimacy to it. Recent scholarship offers a variety of amelioration proposals (examples are Hollis and 
Pogge 2008; Love and Hubbard 2007; Gupta 2006) and open innovation models have greatly enhanced 
the input possibilities of different communities and individuals, such as amateur and retired scientists 
and indigenous innovators. Especially the global poor are in dire need of a system that reviews science 
and the resulting end-products with social welfare as the judging parameter and not with a sole 
emphasis on possible marketability.  
In the spirit of democratic principles, people should have the right to participate on equal terms in the 
decision over what rights they should have over the access possibilities, shape and direction of future 
technologies and science. Having a larger circle of participants will provide a higher diversity in end 
products.17 Without this higher diversity people will be limited in having to accept products (and 
methods) that were already preselected by others who not necessarily live up to the same set of values 
– a situation where “real choice” has limited meaning. As a last point, any active exclusion of people 
will be felt as an offense.18 Here it is crucial to remove any unnecessary barriers that could hinder 
participation possibilities. Some barriers might still be necessary to maintain a high level of scientific 
output; here we can count elements such as having common nominators for naming natural and 
artificial objects and the freedom to treat knowledge instrumentally (something that might interfere 
with the notion of sacred knowledge) as necessary for a swifter progress.  
                                                         
17 Here we may think of the reintroduction of Chinese traditional medicine and the new willingness to 
assess unfamiliar treatment methods after the monopoly standing of Western medicine was broken.  
18 In this passage my argumentation is strongly influenced by Waldron (1998). 
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Science, as mentioned, can play a vital role in improving the situation of the world’s poorest, and also 
the wealthiest, people. Due to this capacity, there is a risk in seeing science as having a purely 
instrumental function. When perceiving science as a societal tool, we have to acknowledge that we 
affect the dynamic of scientific progress. The recognition-seeking scientist generally adapts her 
behaviour to match the expectations of the agent whose recognition is aimed for (cf. O'Neill 1998). 
Nowadays, most scientists are seeking the recognition of researchers from industry and academia. The 
moment scientists start to seek societal recognition, rather than only close peer recognition, research 
agendas change in order to aim at satisfying any diverging expectations. 
 
Prioritizing participation or access 
 
Enjoying the benefits of scientific advancement does not constitute a single-standing right, but allows 
up to a certain extent the fulfilment of other human rights, particularly the right to health and the right 
to food. Further, being able to share in the advancement of science for a prolonged time presupposes 
that the two latter rights have been met. A very sick person suffering hunger can contribute little to 
science. It can be said that one right is dependent upon having the other rights satisfied (cf. Shue 
1996). We can go even a step further and say that in most cases people need to have benefited from 
science before being able to take part in science. This prerequisite being twofold, one not only needs to 
have access to medicines, to take an example, but also have access to prior scientific knowledge for 
one’s input to be meaningful, this being increasingly dependent on being able to access research 
networks and scientific infrastructure. Exceptions to this rule are extremely rare. 
 
Let us imagine three possible worlds. One, where any effort in incentivizing people to engage in 
science is put aside in order to use all available resources to ensure that every person can enjoy the 
benefits of existing fruits of innovation. The second is a world where it is held to be more efficient to 
enhance global social welfare if only one particular group of the world concentrates in taking part in 
science while everybody is allowed to benefit from this group’s contribution. The third scenario is a 
world where a special emphasis is made on building up scientific infrastructure, while neglecting 
efforts to make the fruits of scientific progress promptly available to the poor. Elaborating those 
theoretical worlds can give us some insights on how to judge proposals and movements that aim to 
alleviate the negative effects of intellectual property regimes.  
 
To clarify the controversy of prioritization, I will elaborate on the effects of such worlds starting with 
the first one. This position considers large-scale scientific projects, examples often referred to are the 
International Space Station and particle accelerators, as luxuries civil society should condemn while 
people are massively dying from hunger and disease. Often ignored is that the efficacy and usefulness 
of a technology depends upon the environment it is placed into. Weeds, bacteria and other organisms 
develop resistance to agents that attempt to combat them – a phenomenon most prominently 
characterized by pathogens developing resistance to antibiotics (cf. Outterson 2005). Then we also 
have changing natural habitats due to climate change and raising pollutants levels. Stalling scientific 
progress means for a variety of technologies retrogression in the long term.  
This policy is particularly demanding for the better-off circle of people among the current generation. 
They will not be able to improve their well-being by developing new tools through scientific methods 
and this partly due to the previous generations’ policies of not taking sufficient regard for the situation 
of the worse-off. The more time is needed to ensure widespread enjoyment of the benefits of science 
the more demanding this position becomes for the better-off. Such a standpoint limits a higher 
aggregate welfare in order to increase the welfare of the worst-off (cf. Parfit 1997). The ICESCR states 
in article 11.1 however, that being able to work towards the “continuous improvement of living 
conditions” is a fundamental right. Arguably, this article would give the individual scientist enough 
room to better her own position, even in cases where strict prioritarianism would morally demand to 
focus one’s efforts on the needs of the worst-off.  
 
The second situation is a world that aims at leaving people above a certain threshold line in terms of 
welfare. It can have two moral justifications. A sufficientarian explanation that welcomes the needy to 
benefit from the advancement of science, but sees participation in scientific enterprises as something 
beyond basic necessities – to put it bluntly, as a luxury people can be excluded from without moral 
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scruple. Or, more benignly, explained by a strict appeal to urgency towards alleviating the position of 
the worst off while perceiving the availability of resources as limited. In this case capacity-building in 
the poor regions of the world is seen as a luxury one cannot justify while people are starving or 
suffering diseases that science could cure or prevent. This position relies strongly on the assumptions 
that resources are limited and limited to a particular level. However one should differentiate between 
resources that are limited per se and resources that are limited due to resource allocation decisions that 
especially developed countries can influence or have previously made.19 Even if efficiency is the sole 
determinant for such a policy decision, one cannot escape as a society from having to defend why one 
has chosen to allocate insufficient resources to address both distresses.  
 
Our third hypothetical scenario is a world in which capacity-building is prioritized over a widespread 
access to the objects of innovation. For such position to survive Rawls’ Difference Principle capacity-
building has to lead to enough fruits to leave the worst-off in a better position. As ensuring access is 
neglected under this approach a strong emphasis on the production of public goods has to be set to 
ensure that enough benefits reach the worst-off, something that again will limit the freedom to take 
part in scientific advancement by having to carefully select research agendas. Capacity-building will 
also have to lead to a substantial number of inventions which can be either acquired or duplicated by 
the global poor.   
This position becomes highly controversial, if we take into consideration that enjoying the benefits of 
science in order to stay healthy or ensure one’s nutritional requirements is something necessary to be 
able to enjoy other rights and a prosperous life. Millions of people will never be able to share in 
science as malnutrition in the first years of their lives hampered their full brain development. In 
addition to that, taking part in scientific progress is a freedom only few people make use of, an even a 
tinier group would consider it as an essential part for the pursuit of one’s ideal of a good life.  
An outright reality check impedes us to believe that science on its own, even if heavily subsidized, 
could significantly improve the situation of the world’s poorest inhabitants. Great initiatives that foster 
grassroots innovation and open science will still have to be supported by organizations that make 
previous innovations accessible to the poorest members of society.  
 
Practicing science and being involved in product development encourages an active use of one’s 
mental capacities and builds up a critical mass of people that become aware of unknown consequences 
and also potentials of technologies in use. While asking oneself the question of which element should 
be prioritized, access to the benefits or inclusion in meaningful projects, one has to keep in mind the 
huge inequalities and levels of deprivation people in the world face. Further, we should also consider 
the possibility of refusing to prioritize any of the two elements as a strategy. Facilitating the prospects 
of participating in scientific projects will primarily benefit people in the social middle class20. Those 
people are not the very poor, however they are also not the main beneficiaries of existing inequalities 
nor do they share the full responsibility for the world’s institutional injustices. Developing and 
building up research infrastructure can help a significant number of those people to pursue their 
conception of a good life. However, the level of deprivation we currently face is extreme, making it 
justifiable to set aside such efforts in an attempt to ensure a wider access to the benefits of science. 
Such benefits however have to match the needs of the global poor, a situation we are currently very far 
away from, as the so-called “10/90 gap” in pharmaceutical research epitomizes.21 Sharing benefits that 
only show welfare-improving characteristics for people who already have a high standard of living 
would not substantially meliorate the situation of the worst-off. A prioritarian position permits 
restricting scientific participation possibilities as long as doing so effectively raises the position of the 
worst-off. Urgency makes high reductions of aggregate welfare acceptable, e.g. by lowering the                                                         
19 Timmermann and van den Belt (2012); (2013) criticize the Health Impact Fund proposal on this 
point for making a too broad commitment towards political feasibility.   
20 Here I understand “social middle class” as the group of people who have their basic needs met and 
enjoy a small surplus that enables them to undertake risks (i.e. to try out new possibilities) without too 
much distress. An example would be a small farmer that after securing her basic necessities has still 
some additional seeds left to test a new agricultural method.  
21 This is the situation where only 10% of the world’s resources are used to address the problems that 
primarily affect 90% of the earth’s population, cf. Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group 
(2001). 
  14 
position of best-off, if this is the only way to ensure a higher percentage of people with basic needs 
met.  
  
Justifying capacity-building: Cooperative justice 
 
One of the goals of extending intellectual property protection globally is to make people be able to 
benefit from the fruits of their intellectual labour. We could even consider the possibility of doing so as 
a new global public good. This statement may arouse immediate controversies from different parties. 
Only a minority of intellectual labourers are able to live from the fruits of what they produce. Which 
inventions will become lucrative, and who will be able to live from them, has less to do with desert 
than with circumstances the individual has no control over. Coming up independently with the same 
invention the day later bears no fruits one has claims on (Nozick 1974). Closer to reality would be to 
claim that the recognition of intellectual property amounts to a common good, since it merely allows 
some scientist to live from some of their work.  
The possibility of being able to generate income from scientific work has some great benefits for 
scientific independence and industry, but the practical effectuation of this freedom by some has 
considerable negative effects on others. What are the negative externalities of people enjoying on 
massive scale this opportunity? Here it becomes critical to establish if those negative externalities are 
due to lack of adaptation to new possibilities, i.e. the price of maintaining antiquated practices, or 
indeed amount to unfair advantage taking.  
Economic poverty, as mentioned throughout this article, limits participation under proprietary science 
models, thus hiding to the world the real potential the economic poor have to bring out innovative 
ideas and disclose their scientific observations. There are strong arguments to claim that the use of 
intellectual property rights as introduced with the TRIPS Agreement (1994) does not only amount to 
unfair advantage taking but that the advantageous position that came with the imposition of the 
agreement was foreseeable and some would even argue premeditated (cf. Drahos and Braithwaite 
2003). The treaty comes at a high price for grassroots innovators and people choosing to participate in 
science under a different set of principles. Many of those researchers are actively engaged in 
developing technical solutions for the problems of the poor. As fairer methods of incentivizing 
innovation are conceivable (such as prize systems, see Love and Hubbard 2007), but have not been 
institutionalized, keeping our patent regime demands a justification to the people suffering its negative 
consequences. Those people are scientists and technology developers of resource-scarce countries and, 
most severely, the global poor.  
 
Apart from the above-mentioned problems that affect the liberties of the individual person, there are 
some specific global justice concerns that require a structural reform. The intellectual property regimes 
as they stand, face the charge of harming the global poor and as we – the affluent citizens of the world 
– have established those regimes, we owe the global poor compensation (Pogge 2009). The two most 
apparent harms, as discussed earlier, are caused by high prices to objects of innovation secured by the 
enforcement of exclusive rights on a worldwide scale, and by research agendas set to satisfy the wishes 
of the rich. Here harm is understood as imposing (and maintaining) a less favourable incentive system 
and this with the intention of gaining additional competitive advantages. Excluding ourselves from 
being part of the harming “we” is hardly possible as we strongly rely on the innovation system in our 
daily lives.22 Nevertheless, as citizens of democratic countries we can counter this harm by protesting. 
As scientists and researchers we can also help by refusing to blindly rely on “big names” and being 
much more open to new currents of thoughts, even when format and label does not correspond to our 
image of professionalism. Living life as usual continues to strengthen institutional injustices. 
Further burdens on the global poor are the following: 
 
Patents are harsh on latecomers. The patent system is a winner-take-all arrangement; the first one to 
invent (or in many jurisdictions, to file a patent) gets all the benefits. The inventive-step (or non-
obviousness) requirement of patentability is in relation to the state of the art. It is relative to what the 
top of the field have achieved. This improves patent quality, but almost solely at the cost of the                                                         
22 Pogge (2008) accuses the citizens of the developed world of complicity in the institutional harm 
done to the poor. Others are more hesitant in inculpating the average citizens, e.g. Steinhoff (2012).  
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researchers that are somewhat behind. We can assume that in both cases the latecomers will mostly 
consist of researchers with less access to costly journals and expensive infrastructure. Any possible 
advantages one may come across as a latecomer will vanish if one is not capable to play under the 
same rules of the game than preceding researchers or is not endowed with a comparable set of starting 
tools. The so-called “evergreening of patents”, the ability to continue to delay the moment generic 
manufacturers can enter the market without seeking a license, is something that has increasingly come 
into criticism (cf. Dwivedi et al. 2010).  
 
Patent expenses and purchasing power parity. About half of the world population live beneath the 
two-dollar a day poverty line. This line takes into consideration purchasing power parity, that is the 
fact that some products are much cheaper in poorer countries than in richer countries (cf. Pogge 2010). 
Notwithstanding this being false for many medicines, it is not true at all for the costs of patent 
protection. Developed world companies can seek exclusive rights for their inventions at comparable 
much lower cost for themselves in developing countries than companies from developing countries in 
the developed world. Industry and research institutes situated in the developing world have to acquire 
(with few exceptions) licenses for follow-up research or product development at world market prices, 
despite the huge purchasing power differences. Here we can generally question the patent holder’s 
right to have full control over the conditions to grant licenses.  
 
Harmonization of safety standards. Safety standards can be held very high without objections as long 
as there are cheaper alternatives for the poor or people with fewer resources are not excluded from the 
high standard products. This is not the case with much technological advancement in agriculture and 
medicine. Having worldwide standards that are in line with welfare levels experienced in developed 
countries leads to a situation where many less safe, but still quite cost-effective and beneficent 
products, are not developed. Many research leads that are feared to not pass safety regulations are 
dismissed, even though they could lead to welfare enhancing products for resource poor settings – 
generally solutions that are much better than nothing are put aside.  
 
The worldwide recognition of the current intellectual property standards has also a row of benefits. 
There is a set of goods – generally identified under the label “luxury goods” – for which excluding 
people appears to have no unacceptable consequences. The knowledge gained while developing and 
researching for those objects listed in patent documents ultimately becomes part of the public domain 
after a transition time. The diversity of technological extravagancies incentivized by rewards secured 
by intellectual property leads to an enlargement of the pool of knowledge. In addition to that, people 
who justify intellectual property on desert-based principles can argue that, on utilitarian terms, the 
more intellectuals can live from the fruits of their labour the better. Libertarians welcome lower 
taxation by not having to finance science programs that can sustain themselves through the sales of 
their developed products.  
 
Even after summing up the global benefits of intellectual property, we can still maintain that the 
developed world has imposed an innovation incentive system that disproportionally favours the 
world’s richest people. If there are some overall benefits of having this type of regimes established, 
justice demands that burdens and benefits are to be distributed fairly. In order for intellectual property 
to be recognized as such, members of society have to accept this method of incentivizing innovation as 
a necessity that leads to everyone’s advantage. This demands a clear balance between private and 
public interests, with both parties satisfied with the concessions made. When this is not the case 
intellectual property has to be safeguarded by extortive measures, something that has to be paid for by 
making the products of innovation even more difficult to access. Further, if we see global trade as a 
cooperative endeavour where everybody should benefit, cooperative justice would demand a serious 
effort in capacity-building and a system that fairly evaluates grassroots innovation, as well as 
compensatory measures like the Health Impact Fund (Hollis and Pogge 2008). Meeting one’s side of a 
cooperative arrangement puts us in a much better position for demanding help in times of distress on 
terms of reciprocity and motivates the other partner in exploring further cooperation possibilities.  
Where we can rely on past and on-going positive experiences, as with the cases of vaccine 
development and large-scale immunization efforts, the establishment of new programs and the 
reaffirming of existing commitments have shown great success, as the Global Alliance for Vaccination 
and Immunization (GAVI) exemplifies. However, raised population levels, extreme poverty and 
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increased mobility demand urgently an even stronger commitment to work constructively together, 
since many of the global hazards we now face demand organized action at a global scale. Controlling 
antibiotic resistance (cf. Anomaly 2010) and speeding up the sharing of samples in times of epidemic 
outbreaks (cf. Langat et al. 2011) are two of the many critical targets.  
 
Perhaps the human rights framework and the capabilities approach do not yield enough argumentative 
strength to establish claim rights that would assist people in becoming a scientist. However, analysing 
the huge gap in research potential between the developed and developing world, we have a series of 
arguments that lead us to condemn current distributions of scientific capacities. If one party feels or is 
perceived as dependent, dispensable, or even as a burden, we are certainly failing to meet the social 
goal of people living on equal standing. Enabling people to make a meaningful contribution helps to 
overcome this problem and this in a way in which both – developed and developing countries – can 
profit in the long run. Providing scientific infrastructure, education and access to research networks is a 
certain path to do so.   
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the CSG researchers’ day June 2012 in Utrecht, the 
Political Philosophy Conference in Vejle and the Global Justice and International Economic 
Institutions Workshop in Leuven (both August 2012) where I gratefully received valuable feedback. I 
am also indebted to critical comments and suggestions made by Henk van den Belt, Michiel Korthals, 
Annabelle Lever, John O’Neill, Zofia Stemplowska, two anonymous reviewers and the editor.  
 
The present version was finalized during a researcher stay at the Fondation Brocher. This article is 
result of a research project of the Centre for Society and the Life Sciences in The Netherlands, funded 
by the Netherlands Genomics Initiative.  
 
References 
 
Agrawal, A. (1995). Dismantling the divide between indigenous and scientific knowledge. 
Development and Change, 26, 413-439. 
Anderson, E. (2007). Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective. Ethics, 
117(4), 595-622. 
Anomaly, J. (2010). Combating resistance: the case for a global antibiotics treaty. Public Health 
Ethics, 3(1), 13-22. 
Arneson, R. (1987). Meaningful work and market socialism. Ethics, 97(3), 517-545. 
Baulcombe, D., Crute, I., Davies, B., Dunwell, J., Gale, M., Jones, J., et al. (2009). Reaping the 
benefits: science and the sustainable intensification of global agriculture. London, UK: The 
Royal Society. 
Chan, S., & Harris, J. (2009). Free riders and pious sons - why science research remains obligatory. 
Bioethics, 23(3), 161-171. 
Chapman, A. R. (2009). Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific 
Progress and Its Applications. Journal of Human Rights, 8(1), 1-36. 
Donders, Y. (2011). The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress: in search of the state 
obligations in relation to health. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 14, 371-381. 
Drahos, P., & Braithwaite, J. (2003). Information feudalism : who owns the knowledge economy? New 
York: New Press. 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group (2001). Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and 
Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases. Geneva: Médecins Sans Frontières. 
Dübgen, F. (2012). Africa humiliated? Misrecognition in development aid. Res Publica, 18, 65-77. 
Dumitru, S. (2008). Are Rawlsians Entitled to Monopoly Rights? In A. Gosseries, A. Strowel, & A. 
Marciano (Eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (pp. 57-72). Houndmills & 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dwivedi, G., Hallihosur, S., & Rangan, L. (2010). Evergreening: A deceptive device in patent rights. 
Technology in Society, 32(4), 324-330. 
  17 
Eisenberg, R. S. (2008). Noncompliance, nonenforcement, nonproblem? Rethinking the anticommons 
in biomedical research. Houston Law Review, 45(4), 1059-1099. 
Fraser, N. (1998). Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and 
Participation. In G. B. Peterson (Ed.), The Tanner Lectures of Human Values (Vol. 19, pp. 1-
67). Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press. 
Fraser, N., & Gordon, L. (1994). “Dependency” demystified: inscriptions of power in a keyword of the 
welfare state. Social politics: International studies in gender, state & society, 1(1), 4-31. 
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Galeano, E. (1971/2008). Las venas abiertas de América Latina. Madrid: Siglo XXI. 
Green, M. (2000). Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Day of General Discussion "The right of everyone to 
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author (article 15.1 (c) of the Covenant)" 
organized in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Ed.), E/C.12/2000/15. Geneva. 
Greene, M. T. (1984). Alfred Wegener. Social Research, 51(3), 739-761. 
Gupta, A. K. (2006). From sink to source: the Honey Bee Network documents indigenous knowledge 
and innovations in India. Innovations, (summer), 49-66. 
Gupta, A. K. (2010). Grassroots Green Innovations for Inclusive, Sustainable Development. In A. 
Lopez-Claros (Ed.), The Innovation for Development Report 2009-2010, Strengthening 
Innovation for the Prosperity of the Nations (pp. 137-146). Houndmills & New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Harris, J. (2005). Scientific research is a moral duty. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31(4), 242-248. 
Hollis, A., & Pogge, T. W. (2008). The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for 
All. Oslo & New Haven: Incentives for Global Health. 
ICSU Study Group on Science and Traditional Knowledge (2002). Science and Traditional 
Knowledge: Report from the ICSU Study Group on Science and Traditional Knowledge.  
Kitcher, P. (1990). The division of cognitive labor. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(1), 5-22. 
Korthals, M., & Timmermann, C. (2012). Reflections on the International Networking Conference 
“Ethical and Social Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Agrifood and Health” held in 
Brussels, September 2011. Synesis, 3, G66-73. 
Langat, P., Pisartchik, D., Silva, D., Bernard, C., Olsen, K., Smith, M., et al. (2011). Is there a duty to 
share? Ethics of sharing research data in the context of public health emergencies. Public 
Health Ethics, 4(1), 4-11. 
Love, J., & Hubbard, T. (2007). The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines. Chicago-
Kent Law Review, 82(3), 1519-1554. 
Marks, S. P. (2011). The neglected human right to benefit from scientific progress: implications for 
human development. Paper presented at the Human Development and Capabilities 
Association 2011 International Conference, Den Haag, September 6-8 
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and Utopia. Malden & Oxford: Blackwell. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1997). Capabilities and Human Rights. Fordham Law Review, 66(2), 273-300. 
O'Neill, J. (1990). Property in science and the market. The Monist, 73(4), 601-620. 
O'Neill, J. (1998). The politics of recognition. In J. O'Neill (Ed.), The market: ethics, knowledge and 
politics (pp. 102-111). London: Routledge. 
Oosterlaken, i. (2009). Design for development: a capability approach. Design Issues, 25(4), 91-102. 
Outterson, K. (2005). The vanishing public domain: antibiotic resistance, pharmaceutical innovation 
and intellectual property law. University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 67, 67-123. 
Parfit, D. (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3), 202-221. 
Plomer, A. (2012). The right to access the benefits of science and intellectual property rights. In R. 
Bin, S. Lorenzon, & N. Lucchi (Eds.), Biotech Innovations and Fundamental Rights (pp. 45-
68). Milan: Springer-Verlag Italia. 
Pogge, T. W. (2008). World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms 
(2nd ed.). Cambridge and Malden: Polity. 
Pogge, T. W. (2009). The Health Impact Fund and its justification by appeal to human rights. Journal 
of Social Philosophy, 40(4), 542-569. 
  18 
Pogge, T. W. (2010). Politics as usual : what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric. Cambridge, UK ; 
Malden, MA: Polity. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice (Rev. ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Robeyns, I. (2005). The capability approach: a theoretical survey. Journal of Human Development, 
6(1), 93-114. 
Robeyns, I. (2011). The Capability Approach. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition). 
Sayer, A. (2011). Habitus, work and contributive justice. Sociology, 45(1), 7-21. 
Schoonmaker, S. (2007). Globalization from Below: Free Software and Alternatives to Neoliberalism. 
Development and Change, 38(6), 999-1020. 
Shaver, L. (2010). The right to science and culture. Wisconsin Law Review, 121, 121-184. 
Shue, H. (1996). Basic rights : subsistance, affluence, and U.S. foreign policy (2nd ed.). Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Steinhoff, U. (2012). Why 'we' are not harming the global poor: a critique of Pogge's leap from state to 
individual responsibility. Public Reason, 4(1-2), 119-138. 
Steinvorth, U. (2009). The right to work and the right to develop one's capabilities. Analyse & 
Kritik(1), 101-113. 
Stephan, P. E. (2012). How economics shapes science. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University 
Press. 
Taylor, R. (2004). Self-realization and the priority of fair equality of opportunity. Journal of Moral 
Philosophy, 1(3), 333-347. 
Timmermann, C., & Belt, H. v. d. (2013). Intellectual property and global health: from corporate social 
responsibility to the access to knowledge movement. Liverpool Law Review, 34(1), 47-73. 
Timmermann, C., & van den Belt, H. (2012). Global justice considerations for a proposed "Climate 
Impact Fund". Public Reason, 4(1-2), 182-196. 
TNS Opinion & Social (2010). Eurobarometer 73.1: Biotechnology. Brussels: European Commission. 
UNESCO (2009). The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications. Paris: 
UNESCO. 
United Nations (1948). 151st Meeting, held on Monday, 22 November 1948 (A/C.3/SR.361). General 
Assembly, 3rd Session, 3rd Committee. Paris: United Nations. 
Waldron, J. (1998). Participation: The right of rights. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98(3), 
307-337. 
Weber, M. (1919/2002). Wissenschaft als Beruf. In D. Kaesler (Ed.), Max Weber Schriften 1894 – 
1922 (pp. 473-511). Stuttgart: Kröner. 
 
 
